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Abstract 
Adopting Krasner’s thesis of organized hypocrisy, this research examined the institution of 
sovereignty in regard to the  naturalization of migrant spouses in Taiwan. Using migrant spouses 
as a case study, this article argues that the hypocrisy of Taiwan’s sovereignty lies in demanding 
migrants to renounce their native nationality or cancel their household registration. This demand 
not only fails to prevent statelessness but also prompts the origin state to recognize or reject 
Taiwan’s sovereignty. The interactions between Taiwan and the origin states of migrant spouses 
from Japan, Vietnam and China underline the hypocrisy of Taiwan’s sovereignty. The 
more Taiwan insists on migrant spouses renouncing their original nationality, the 
more this destabilizes  Taiwan’s sovereignty because of its lack of international recognition. 





Challenges to state sovereignty continue and presently, these concerns persist in the light of a 
transnational and globalized world. Transnational migration—the movement across national 
borders—is one of the processes that renders national boundaries porous (Chamberlain, 2015). 
Transnational migration to Taiwan poses a  challenge to the state’s capacity to control in-bound 
migration. It is also an ontological contestation of the very existence of its statehood, since Taiwan 
is not universally recognized as a sovereign state under the official title of the Republic of China 
(ROC). Focusing on the case of migrant spouses, this paper argues that Taiwan’s naturalization 
laws and its interactions with  the origin states of foreign spouses concerning the granting of 
citizenship is an illustration of the hypocrisy of sovereignty (Krasner, 1999).  Seeing the 
requirement of renunciation as an assertion of Taiwan’s challenged sovereignty, this hypocrisy is 
manifested by Taiwan’s flexibility towards Japanese citizens’ unavailability of renunciation, in 
contrast to Taiwan’s rigidity towards Vietnamese citizens and its pragmatism of using household 
registration as a make-believe nationality for Chinese citizens. Hypocrisy is also embedded in the 
reaction of these origin states, under their One China Policy, to the requirement of renunciation. 
While Japan objects, Vietnam permits and China facilitates their citizens’ acquisition of 
Taiwan’s citizenship. 
Since the late 1980s, Taiwan has risen to  become a major destination in East Asia for 
migrant workers as well as migrant spouses.  Men and women from Southeast Asia are employed 
in construction, manufacturing and caregiving which have been shunned by local workers. (). 
Taiwan, like other destination countries in Asia, including those in the Gulf region, maintains a 
strict ‘guest workers’ policy and denies them eligibility for naturalization (Wang, 2011; Lu, 
2000;Tseng and Komiya, 2011), a condition which makes Taiwan a ‘walled state’ (Brown, 
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2010). In contrast, naturalization is open to migrant spouses, mostly women (Kawaguchi and 
Lee, 2012). Pursuing betterment for themselves and their families, migrant wives from China, 
Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia and Burma have settled in Taiwan after 
their marriage and formed a family  with Taiwanese citizens.  
From 1987 to 2016, a total of 152,817 foreign women, mainly from the abovementioned 
Southeast Asian countries, as well as 318,338 Mainland Chinese women, resided in Taiwan as 
spouses of Taiwanese citizens (NIA, 2017). Among them, a total of 115,392 foreign women 
(including a very small fraction of non-Southeast Asian origins) and 119,147 Chinese women 
had acquired citizenship (NIA, 2017). Considering the small number of naturalizations that were 
granted by means other than marriage with Taiwanese citizens (4.34 percent of total 
naturalizations between 1982 and 2015) (MoI, 2015), migrant wives comprise the overwhelming 
majority of foreign-born citizens in Taiwan. Under Taiwanese law, naturalization cannot be 
completed without renunciation of the applicant’s native or previous nationality. For the citizens 
of the  People’s Republic of China (PRC), given the mutual non-recognition of Taiwan and 
China for each other’s sovereignty, instead of relinquishing their PRC nationality as foreign 
nationals shall do, they are required to cancel their household registration in China, as a 
substitute for renunciation..  
Given the contested statehood of Taiwan, this paper raises an obvious but rarely asked 
question: how could Taiwan, whose sovereignty is not universally recognized by the 
international community, make foreign citizens to lose their original nationality and replace it 
with a nationality that is only officially recognized by 20 states as of  June 2017? This question 
was brought to the fore by a comment made by a Vietnamese woman I interviewed in 2009. As 
she put it, ‘the Taiwanese nationality has to be real, otherwise why would I lose my Vietnamese 
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nationality to get a fake one?’ Given that nationality is the foundation for human dignity (Gross 
2001: 851), if the sovereignty of Taiwan is considered non-existent in  international politics, how 
can it have such a significant effect on naturalized foreign nationals? Considering that the state is 
morally obliged to prevent its citizens from being stateless, how can the origin states of the 
115,392 marriage migrants allow them to relinquish their legal bond with their native country? If 
Taiwan were a ‘renegade province’ as claimed by the PRC, how can a ‘provincial’ authority 
endow 119,147 PRC citizens with ROC citizenship and issue them ROC passports which enable 
them to travel around the world? These are the puzzles that this research intends to tackle.  
To carry out this research which cuts across international politics and transnational 
migration, it adopts the concept of ‘organized hypocrisy’ coined by Krasner (1999) about 
sovereignty.  In line with Krasner’s argument that it is hypocritical that lacking universal 
recognition does not prevent Taiwan from developing relationships with other states, this 
research further argues that hypocrisy is also pronounced by Taiwan’s interactions with other 
states in regard to renunciation. The hypocrisy lies in the critical decisions of  how the origin 
states regard Taiwan’s sovereignty and whether  they permit or object to their citizens losing 
their nationality. Hypocrisy is also found in Taiwan’s t appropriation of  household registration 
as a replacement for nationality, a practice that is tacitly accepted by the PRC. These findings 
will deepen our understanding of the limitations of sovereignty as an institution that is morally 
obliged to protect human dignitys.  
Before examining the impact of renunciation, it is necessary to review how the 
sovereignty of Taiwan is being analyzed from the vantage point of marriage migration. This 
review is to be followed by a discussion of how sovereignty is diagnosed as ‘organized 
hypocrisy’ by Krasner (1999).  
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Sovereignty and marriage migration 
As shown above, the PRC is the largest source of marriage migration to Taiwan. The growing 
Taiwanese identity and partisan differences between the two major political parties on policies 
toward China have politicized the issue of  marriage migration from China (Chen and Yu, 2005). 
. Cheng (2016) points out that, despite democratisation and political reform in the early 1990s, 
PRC citizens continue to be constitutionally regarded as ROC nationals. The task of defining this 
confusing status is left to the Act Governing the Relations between People of the Taiwan Area 
and the Mainland Area promulgated in 1992 (conventionally known as the Cross-Strait Relations 
Act). The Cross-Strait Relations Act  ascertains that they are neither foreign nor domestic but 
‘special.’ Their special status creates a dual track in citizenship legislation (Wu, 2008):  while 
foreign spouses have to relinquish their original nationality to acquire ROC citizenship, Chinese 
spouses are required to cancel their household registration in China. In the latter case, the 
household registration  signifies the territorial link between Chinese spouses and the state of 
Taiwan thereby legitimizing their acquisition of citizenship in Taiwan (Cheng, 2016).  
Aided by ethnographic insights, Friedman (2015) asserts that research on sovereignty 
cannot be restricted to its philosophical foundation or institutional specifications. Rather, the 
effects of sovereignty on migrants’ legal status  can be created and experienced through mundane 
interactions between government agents and Chinese spouses at public hearings, orientation 
courses, street rallies or the administered ‘border’ erected at the landing ports of Taiwan. Chao 
(2004, 2005) and Chen (2010) note that the determination of authenticating marriages between 
couples from mutually hostile regimes underscore the anxieties of the patriarchal state of Taiwan 
in asserting its contested sovereignty and protecting the porous border that is being transgressed 
by marriage.  
6 
  
It is commonly acknowledged that the politicization of  marriage migration from China is 
rooted in the threat posed by the PRC—mainly the denial of Taiwan’s sovereignty (Wu, 2008)— 
to the survival of the island nation (Wang, 2011).  Although Southeast Asian states also do not 
recognize Taiwan’s sovereignty, they are not seen as posing an imminent threat to Taiwan’s 
legal existence. Being economically more developed, Taiwan views the Southeast Asian 
countries as sites to lower production costs (Huang, 2006; Hsiao, 2003). The government’s Go 
South policy was an attempt to earn more  profits for Taiwanese investments as well as loosening 
these countries’ One China Policy (Peng, 1997; Huang and Liaw, 2012).  
 
Under such circumstances, marriage migration from Southeast Asia is less of a political 
or is even an  apolitical issue. The threat posed by this migration is conceptualized along the line 
of eugenics, based on the perception by the government and society at large that children born to 
poor, less educated and non-Chinese-speaking Southeast Asian mothers  will erode Taiwan’s 
international competitiveness (NSC, 2006: 61; Kuo, 2011). For this reason, in 2005, Chinese 
language proficiency (or passing a test on the way of life in Taiwan) became a prerequisite for 
naturalization in addition to financial adequacy. Other studies also point out that the stress on 
reproduction and motherhood is a case of biopolitics, which marks the bodies of migrant spouses 
as an ethnic boundary between the host state and migrant outsiders (Lan, 2008; Chen, 2009; 
Yuval-Davis and Anthias, 1989: 7). In sum, various studies allude to the selectiveness of 
Taiwan’s sovereignty as embedded in the naturalization legislation, reflecting biases of 
patriarchy, sexism, nationalism and classism (Wang, 2008, 2011; Sheu, 2007; Tsai, 2011; Yang 




It is interesting to note that no questions have been raised on the sovereignty itself in the 
context of marriage migration. That is, how can Taiwan, a state that is not widely recognized,  
require  migrant spouses to renounce their original citizenship to acquire Taiwanese citizenship 
that is not considered ‘real’ by the international community? Likewise, there have not been 
sufficient attempts at comparing the different requirements for Chinese and foreign spouses to 
understand how transnational migration  affects the operation of sovereignty. Viewing 
renunciation as a major ‘sovereignty effect’ (Friedman, 2015) whereby Taiwan exercises its 
sovereignty, this research will show how sovereignty as a concept and as an institution is 
fundamentally hypocritical for its self-contradiction against the responsibility of preventing 
statelessness.  By juxtaposing the different citizenship requirements applied to Chinese and 
foreign spouses, this article will show the struggles of Taiwan in securing legitimacy for its 
sovereignty in the international community on the one hand, and the hypocrisy of its sovereignty 
in its interactions with Japan, Vietnam and China.  
To tackle this puzzle, this research employed and modified Krasner’s (1999) thesis of 
‘organized hypocrisy.’  
Sovereignty: Organized hypocrisy 
States are endowed with authority to rule over the people in a defined territory and have the 
power to operate this authority inside and outside the territory. Krasner delineates the meanings 
of sovereignty into four non-exclusive categories. International legal sovereignty refers to the 
mutual recognition received and offered by any given state. Westphalian sovereignty addresses 
the ultimate and inalienable authority of a state for its internal affairs within its territory. 
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Domestic sovereignty is the conglomerated power endowed to the government for decision-
making over public affairs, such as fiscal, economic and environmental policies. Interdependent 
sovereignty operates in the context  of transnational movement of capital, people, ideas, goods 
and services (Krasner, 1999: 9-25). The former two categories allude to the realm of authority. 
Domestic sovereignty is concerned about authority and control, while the interdependent 
sovereignty belongs to the domain of control (Krasner, 1999: 4, 10). Krasner dismisses 
globalization or transnational movement as forces that can uproot the foundation of international 
legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty. To him, these challenges mainly test the 
capability of the state to safeguard its borders, ensure the reception of benefits of transnational 
movement, manage the consequences of globalisation, and coordinate with other states for all of 
these tasks. These are the issues that defy the control of the government rather than weaken its 
authority (Krasner, 1999: 12, 220-223).  
Krasner articulates that fundamental challenges are those that cast doubt on the authority 
of the state’s sovereignty. The authority of the state is built on the principles of external 
recognition and internal supremacy, twin values that are at the core of international legal 
sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty, respectively. However, these are the same values 
where hypocrisy is found; that is, the discrepancy between these normative values and practices, 
according to Krasner.  Krasner cites several examples where hypocrisy is at work. In the realm of 
international legal sovereignty, the lack of external recognition does not prevent non-recognized 
states, such as Taiwan, from developing bilateral and multilateral relationships with other states ( 
Krasner, 1999: 4). Sub-state units, such as Hong Kong in the World Trade Organization, and 
Ukraine and Belarus in the United Nations during the Cold War, were offered membership to 
international organizations that otherwise restrict membership to sovereign states ( Krasner, 
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1999: 16).  As regards to Westphalian sovereignty, rulers of strong states interfere in the 
domestic affairs of weaker states, or rulers of weaker states allow other states or international 
organizations to influence their economic, fiscal and social policies. The many ‘exceptions’ to 
external recognition and internal supremacy led Krasner to  view these violations as  ‘organized 
hypocrisy’ ( Krasner, 1999: 9).  
 
Krasner explains that his theorisation of organized hypocrisy adopts an ‘actor-oriented’ 
approach and the ruler of the state is the unit of analysis (Krasner, 1999: 43). In geopolitics 
where material resources are asymmetrically allocated among states, rulers may or may not 
choose to abide by the principles of external recognition and internal supremacy when they make 
decision in their foreign or domestic policies. Their decisions are pragmatically constrained by 
their intention of staying in office and the necessity of satisfying the interests of their 
constituents. The source of organized hypocrisy derives from the violation of these principles 
that are held as the essence of sovereignty (Krasner, 1999: 9). 
In applying the concept of organized hypocrisy to the issue of renunciation, this research 
focused on international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty because renunciation is 
principally an issue of authority rather than control. It is an issue of Westphalian sovereignty 
because it contests whether the apparatus of sovereignty can exercise its jurisdiction within its 
territory on migrants without being compromised or impeded. It is also an issue of international 
legal sovereignty because renunciation cannot be realized without the permission of the origin 
state. Given that the state is morally bound to prevent its citizens from becoming stateless, the 
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origin state’s agreement to renunciation is an expressed opinion of the existence of the state of 
Taiwan.  
Therefore, the unit of analysis in this research is not the ruler but the institution of 
sovereignty. The ruler’s preservation of self-interest is conceptually treated as given while the 
conglomerated outcome of their foreign policy – the One China Policy and the non-recognition 
of the statehood of Taiwan - constitutes an external structure that cannot be unilaterally changed 
by Taiwan. What concerns this research is whether an international legal sovereignty that suffers 
from limited external recognition prevents Taiwan from receiving the agreement of other states 
for renunciation and replacing the lost nationality with ROC nationality. This research is also 
concerned about the operation of Westphalian sovereignty (i.e., a nation-state’s sovereignty over 
its territory and domestic affairs) in Taiwan, and how it exerts its ultimate and inalienable 
jurisdiction over foreign and PRC citizens. In tendon with research of international law on the 
anomalies and inconsistencies of nationality theory and legislation stemmed from non-
recognition of sovereignty (Grossman, 2001), the findings of this research will provide an 
institutional perspective from which to underline the hypocrisy of sovereignty.  
In the following section of case study, I used the existing literature in drawing a 
geopolitical picture of the hypocrisy of Taiwan’s sovereignty as shaped by the One China Policy. 
Against this background, I then  used the Legislative Yuan Gazette and news reports to examine 
how the state of Taiwan executes the renunciation of foreign spouses’ native nationality and the 
cancellation of Chinese spouses’ household registration. Restricted by publicly available 
information, my examination of how foreign governments respond to this requirement 
concentrated on Japan and Vietnam. The two cases are chosen because they are the largest 
source countries of migrant spouses from developed (Japan) and developing (Vietnam) countries. 
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More importantly, the Taiwanese government openly acknowledges Japan  as not recognizing 
Taiwan’s sovereignty, whereas Vietnam is known for receiving a large number of returned 
spouses who became stateless after renunciation. This research argues that the hypocrisy arising 
from renunciation is found in two aspects. On the one hand, the state of Taiwan does not 
acknowledge the inherent contradiction between its demand of renunciation and its responsibility 
to prevent statelessness. In practice, the co-existence of flexibility and rigidity Taiwan shows to 
Japan and Vietnam regarding renunciation, and Taiwan’s appropriation of household registration 
as a nationality substitute for PRC immigrants underlie the   precariousness of external 
recognition that is considered pivotal to the existence of sovereignty.  
The known story of hypocrisy: Geopolitics and One China Policy 
 
Although Taiwan is able to maintain links with states around the world, its sovereignty is 
rendered uncertain because of geopolitical interests pursued by major powers such as China and 
the US. During the Cold War, the sovereignty of Taiwan, under the official title of ROC, was 
undermined following the Chinese Civil War (Morello, 1966). It lost its claim of legitimately 
representing China after the Sino-US rapprochement since 1972. Having secured its legitimacy 
as the sole representative of China, the PRC ousted the ROC from the UN and other major 
international organizations. The PRC claims sovereignty over Taiwan and its offshore islands 
(Gu, 1995) and it maintains that Taiwan is part of China as a renegade province. China ensures 
that its allies, including Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines, which are the major 
sources of migrant spouses to Taiwan, adhere to this so-called One China Policy.  
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What makes the international legal sovereignty of Taiwan even more fragile is its 
aspiration for self-determination (Deans, 2001). Since the constitutional reforms that began in the 
early 1990s, in spite of clinging onto the Civil War legacy of claiming sovereignty over 
Mainland China, Taiwan has realistically and pragmatically acknowledges that its jurisdiction 
has been scaled down to the territory that has been under its effective control since 1949, which 
is the aggregation of Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen and Mazu (Taiwan proper) (Lee, 1999; Hughes, 
1999). In the wake of democratization from the 1990s, the once suppressed indigenous desire for 
independence rose in popularity and stirred calls for formalizing its de facto and de jure 
separation from China (Roy, 2003:183-246). Nevertheless, the islanders have yet to reach a 
national consensus on the ultimate status of the nation-state and until then, Taiwan cannot 
finalize its legal relationship with the PRC.  
The sovereignty of Taiwan, thus, is crippled by liminality. Its anachronistic sovereignty claim 
over Mainland China is negated by the PRC, questioned by Taiwanese citizens and ignored by 
most states around the world. On the other hand, in spite of being fully functioning, its 
concurrent sovereignty claim to Taiwan proper is the reality lived by its citizens and migrants, 
rejected by the PRC, and not supported by international community (Tucker, 2011).   Trapped in 
this liminality, the island republic is not officially accepted as either the ROC or Taiwan. It does 
not enjoy the freedom of joining international activities on an equal footing with other sovereign 
states. Stripped of official status, this self-proclaimed state has to be unofficially represented by 
sub- or non-state entities in its engagement with other sovereign states and international 
governmental organizations in areas such as health, fishing, climate change, and sports (Ho, 
2006;  Chang, 2010; Yang and Chien, 2010; Hsiao and Hsiao, 2011; Huang and Wang, 2013).  
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This liminality narrates an already well-known story of how the international legal 
sovereignty of Taiwan is rendered hypocritical because of geopolitical interests, as argued by 
Krasner (1999). What has not been fully examined is how its sovereignty functions as a host 
state of immigration that executes naturalization and renunciation. As explained below, this 
research will argue that being restrained by these international legal and geopolitical 
surroundings, the execution of renunciation of Japanese, Vietnamese and Chinese spouses, and 
the varying interactions between Taiwan and these origin states  is another testimony of the 
hypocrisy of Taiwan’s sovereignty.   
The lesser known story of hypocrisy: Marriage and nationality  
To grant, deny or deprive a person of nationality used to be seen as solely deriving from the 
authority of a sovereign state. However, the massive human displacement partly due to 
statelessness created during the Second World War (Hayden, 2008) resulted in the inclusion of 
the right to nationality as a human right that is enshrined as Article 15 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Van Waa, 2012). As a fundamental human right, having a 
nationality is ‘a foundation of identity, dignity, justice, peace and security’ (Refuge International, 
as cited by Kingston, 2013: 75-76). Developed along lines of liberal philosophy, the acquisition 
(other than by birth) or loss of nationality cannot be made without the express consent of the 
individual. On the other hand, this fundamental right would be meaningless if the state fails to 
grant nationality or prevent the loss of nationality. Since nationality is a matter of legality as well 
as morality, the state is morally responsible for preventing statelessness (Van Waas,  2012), as 
stipulated by the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.  
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However, historically, the nationality of women who marry foreigners poses a violation 
of the fundamental value of free will and potentially leads to statelessness (Scott, 1929; 
Augustine-Adams, 2002; Studer, 2001). In the past, women who marry foreigners  lost their 
original nationality and adopted the nationality of their husbands. This so-called ‘marriage rule’ 
can be found in  the ruling of an Argentinian Court in 1897 stipulating that ‘When a woman 
marries a foreigner, she knows that, by her marriage, she becomes a foreigner, and she consents 
implicitly in the renunciation of her nationality and the acquisition of her husband’s’ (emphasis 
added) (Augustus-Adam, 2002: 19). The deprivation of her original nationality is  a consequence 
for her ‘defection’ of her nation (Epstein, 1978: 106) , while adopting the husband’s nationality 
is upheld on the ‘principle of family unity,’ which is mainly to ensure patrilineal genealogy, 
regarded as the foundation of national belonging (De Hart, 2006a, 2006b). An obvious loophole 
to the idea of  ‘family unity’ is that if a foreign wife did not obtain the nationality of her husband, 
she is rendered stateless (Feinberg, 2006). To prevent statelessness, it is necessary to separate 
marriage from nationality. This was achieved internationally by the 1957 Convention on the 
Nationality of Married Women. With the removal of the marriage rule, spouses, regardless of 
their sex, are offered pathways for naturalization (mostly requiring a shorter duration of 
residency for eligibility), mostly to facilitate the right of the couple and the children to family 
reunion.  
Permit to renounce or not to 
As mentioned earlier, from 1987 to 2016, more than 433,000 foreign wives have resided in 
Taiwan.  Table 1 shows that marriage migration to Taiwan overwhelmingly involves women and 
mostly those from Southeast Asia. From 1999 to 2015, a total of 101,783 wives from Southeast 
Asia had acquired ROC nationality, compared with 160 wives from Japan, South Korea, 
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Singapore, the US and Germany (Table 1).  Ethnographic findings indicate that ROC nationality 
is deemed not only desirable but also necessary by Southeast Asian women for employment, 
social security, non-conditional residency in Taiwan and a sense of equality, inclusion and 
respect (Cheng, 2013; 2017a). In contrast, a qualitative study of Japanese wives suggests that 
ROC nationality was not viewed as essential to their life in Taiwan (Hsiao, 2010). Therefore, 
while ROC sovereignty is universally applied to all foreign spouses, its actual impact on the 
living conditions of women varies according to the women’s ethnicity and socio-economic 
status.  
Table 1. Number of foreign spouses who acquired ROC nationality: 1999-2015. 
Country of origin Men Women Total  
Vietnam 138 69,721 69,859  
Indonesia 210 19,414 19,624  
Cambodia 1 4,509 4,510  
The Philippines 167 4,208 4,375  
Myanmar 183 1,781 1,964  
Thailand 14 1,208 1,222  
Malaysia 48 181 229  
Japan 23 82 105  
Korea 13 64 77  
Singapore 8 8 16  
US 2 5 7  
Germany 0 1 1  
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Others 326 142 468  
Stateless/Unspecified  10 105 115  
Total 1,143 101,429 102,572  
Source: MoI, 2015.  
 
Taiwan, however, has not kept abreast with the global trend in regard to the naturalization 
of foreign spouses and the prevention of statelessness. It implemented the Nationality Law that 
was promulgated in China in 1929, and after 1949, Taiwan executed the marriage rule and the 
principle of family unity: foreign wives were automatically granted ROC nationality upon 
marriage, after they relinquished their nationality of descent. Although renunciation was not 
required by law, administrative decrees included it as a prerequisite to ROC nationality (Tseng, 
1999: 49; Wang, 2011:182). In 2000, the Nationality Law was amended for the very first time 
after being in effect for 71 years. One of the significant changes made was to abolish the 
marriage rule and regard marriage as one of several grounds for naturalization.  The law now 
considers marriage a privileged status qualifying foreign spouses an easier access to nationality 
so as to protect citizens’ right to family life (Tsai, 2008). nevertheless, the law also makes 
renunciation a precondition for all applicants for naturalization, in spite of controversially 
allowing dual nationality for Taiwanese birth citizens (LY, 1998a: 201, 206). Renunciation 
makes foreign spouses vulnerable to statelessness because the legality of their naturalization is 
entirely hinged upon the validity of their marriage.   
As stated above, renunciation is a site where the authority of Westphalian and 
international legal sovereignty is exerted. The Nationality Law of Taiwan stipulates that a 
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foreign spouse, regardless of sex, may be eligible for naturalization if he or she is of good 
character, is financially sufficient, has continuously resided in Taiwan for a minimum of three 
consecutive years, acquires Chinese language ability or passes the test of the knowledge of the 
way of life in Taiwan (Article 3, 4) and has relinquished his/her nationality of descent (Article 
9). Before the Nationality Law was amended in December 2016, after an applicant submitted to 
the government his/her renunciation certification, the applicant would be issued a ‘quasi-
naturalization’ certificate. On this ‘quasi-naturalization’ status, the applicant would have to wait 
from one to five years, depending on the actual days of his/her residency in Taiwan, before 
receiving ROC nationality (Article 4, Notice for the Supporting Documents Required for the 
Applications of Entry, Residency, and Settlement of Nationals without Household Registration 
in Taiwan; Tsai, 2008: 5; LY, 2016: 37). During this ‘in-between’ period, the applicant was 
technically made stateless. If the marriage dissolved during this period because of divorce or 
death of his/her Taiwanese spouse, the applicant not only became stateless but might also face 
expulsion because the cessation of the marriage nullified the legality of his/her residency and 
naturalization.  
 
However, exception can be made to the requirement of renunciation. Article 9 stipulates 
that if a foreign national alleges that renunciation cannot be obtained due to causes that are not 
attributable to the individual, and this has been validated by the Taiwanese government, then 
renunciation may be waived. This article underlines that the loss of nationality is a sovereign 
decision made together by Taiwan and the state of origin. As discussed below, this joint decision 
is a strategic site where the hypocrisy of sovereignty is located. Japan rejects the request of 
renunciation made by its citizens because of its non-recognition of the statehood of Taiwan. In 
18 
  
2010, the number of registered stateless persons in Japan amounted to 1,234, including persons 
of ROC nationality whose statelessness resulted from Japan’s adoption of the One China Policy 
and the change in its diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC in 1972 (Chen, 2012).  In 
November 1998, when the draft bill of the Immigration Act was under parliamentary review, the 
government stated that Japan does not allow dual nationality, thus Japanese citizens could not 
acquire another nationality without prior renunciation of Japanese nationality. Most critically, the 
Taiwanese government confirmed that if the acquired nationality was of a state that was not 
recognized by Japan, such as Taiwan, the Japanese government would overrule such 
renunciation in order to prevent statelessness (LY, 1998a: 190; LY, 1998b: 298, 304). Thus, the 
Taiwanese government has acknowledged Japan’s non-recognition of Taiwan’s international 
legal and Westphalian sovereignty. In response Taiwan exempts Japanese spouses from having 
to renounce their Japanese citizenship.  Article 9 of  Taiwan’s Nationality Law (permitting 
naturalization candidates to retain native nationality in case renunciation is unattainable) was 
specifically promulgated to ease the difficulty encountered by Japanese citizens (Hsiao, 
2010:25). By invoking this exemption, a total of 22 Japanese spouses received ROC nationality 
without losing their Japanese nationality (Liberty Times, 2007).  
Taiwan’s accommodation toward Japan’s policy is a stark contrast to its strict 
enforcement of renunciation on Vietnamese, Filipino and Indonesian women’s application for 
naturalization. There are no publicly available records ascertaining the response of  these three 
states to Taiwan’s demand of renunciation. However, the very fact that they permitted their 
citizens to renounce can be interpreted as  that they do not expressly dispute Taiwan’s 
international legal sovereignty. This is perplexing, considering that  all of them have adopted the 
One China Policy and  have reaffirmed their non-recognition of Taiwan’s statehood in several 
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diplomatic incidents.. (Xinhua News Agency, 2002; BBC Monitoring International Reports 2006; 
the China Post, 2011) Furthermore, all of them have had experience in accommodating in their 
territory a significant number of de jure as well as de facto stateless persons (UNHCR, 2010). 
Thus, it is puzzling on what ground these three states allowed their citizens to sever their 
nationality in order to acquire another one granted by a state that does not receive their 
recognition. Without benefit of evidence at present, it is hard to ascertain whether non-
recognition has an impact on these governments’ decision in regard to renunciation. Nevertheless, 
as mentioned above, their facilitation of renunciation cannot be explained in ways other than 
their acceptance of Taiwan’s statehood and their selective interpretation of One China Policy. 
Such a baffling contradiction between their publicized compliance with the One China Policy 
and their lack of contestation against Taiwan’s sovereignty as far as renunciation is concerned is 
another articulation of the hypocrisy of sovereignty.  
Among these three source countries, Vietnam warrants further attention. It is not only the 
largest source of naturalized Taiwanese citizens but it also received more than 3,000 returnees 
from Taiwan who became stateless (McKinsey, 2007). In 2007, the UNHCR reported the 
hardship endured by Vietnamese women who lost their marriage and returned to Vietnam with 
their children (McKinsey, 2007). Some women were able to regain their Vietnamese nationality, 
whereas others failed partly because of the red tape and the high fees charged by agents for the 
citizenship reacquisition process. While they became de jure stateless in their birth country, their 
children suffered de facto statelessness in Vietnam, because, as ROC citizens, their children were 
foreigners in Vietnam and, as such, they could not attend state school. Deprivation of education 
is one of the most damaging consequences that statelessness could occur to children (McKinsey, 
2007, 2009, 2010). Expelled from Taiwan but unable to restore their Vietnamese nationality, 
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these Vietnamese women lost not one but two nationalities. To solve the problem, the 
Vietnamese government later amended its nationality legislation in 2008 and allowed such 
women to restore their lost nationality (UNHCR, 2010: 10) (.  
 
The Taiwanese government has not been as reconciliatory toward Vietnam as it is toward 
Japan. Instead, Taiwan insisted on asserting its Westphalian sovereignty and maintaining its 
supremacy with regard to demanding renunciation of Vietnamese citizens. In response to 
UNHCR reports (McKinsey 2007), the Taiwanese government issued a press release defending 
its position by saying that Vietnamese spouses whose marriages to Taiwanese nationals were 
dissolved could apply for residency in Taiwan on other statuses, one of which was being the 
guardian of their children. Moreover, the Taiwanese government urged the Vietnamese 
government to shoulder its moral responsibility and to facilitate the restoration of Vietnamese 
citizenship of these stateless women (Lih Pao, 2008).  The Taiwanese government did not 
acknowledge that the requirement of renunciation was the root cause of the Vietnamese women’s 
statelessness and their children’s deprivation of public education in Vietnam. It is also surprising 
that neither the UNHCR nor the Vietnamese government questioned the legitimacy of Taiwan’s 
requirement given their non-recognition of Taiwan’s sovereignty.  
In sum, the above investigation made it clear that by default, sovereignty of any state is 
hypocritical as far as nationality laws are concerned. That is, although nationality is said to be a 
fundamental right indispensable for human dignity, once being institutionalized, its attainment 
and abdication is ultimately controlled by sovereignty. Sovereignty is paradoxically endowed 
with the supreme authority to grant as well as to deny a human being such dignity.  
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 Taiwan is no exception to this paradox.  In spite of their obligation to prevent 
statelessness and their One China Policy, Japan and Vietnam responded differently to Taiwan’s 
requirement for marriage migrants to renounce their original citizenship, and in turn, Taiwan’s 
selective flexibility created another layer of hypocrisy to its Westphalian sovereignty. Rejected 
by Japan, Taiwan turned accommodating and waived the renunciation requirement to solve the 
problem of a very small number of Japanese citizens. On the other hand, with Vietnam’s tacit 
acceptance, Taiwan required nearly 70,000 Vietnamese women to renounce their Vietnamese 
citizenship, and when the issue of 3,000 Vietnamese women’s statelessness emerged, Taiwan 
shifted the blame onto Vietnam. Why and how such confusing contradictions emerge  between 
Taiwan and origin countries will require further empirical research. Suffice to say that this 
inconsistency is a telling indication of hypocrisy. 
A make-believe nationality: Household registration 
While origin states may have varying responses to Taiwan on the issue of renunciation,  the PRC 
has been persistent in denying Taiwan’s sovereignty. However, China’s denial has to come to 
terms with the reality that Taiwan proper has been under  independent jurisdiction since 1949. 
Thus, when Mainland Chinese women migrate and settle in Taiwan, their settlement and the 
granting of citizenship come under Taiwan’s exclusive jurisdiction. This situation presents 
another case that signifies the hypocrisy of Taiwan’s sovereignty.  
 This particular hypocrisy is rooted in the Constitutional Amendments that prolonged the 
Civil War legacy and fall short of recognizing both the PRC and ROC as two separate and 
mutually independent sovereign states. The Preamble of the Constitutional Amendments declares 
that the amendments are aimed at facilitating national unification. For this purpose, the 
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Amendments refrain from acknowledging the PRC as a separate sovereign state but a political 
entity on equal footing to Taiwan (Hughes, 1999: 66; Jacobs, 2005: 36). This provision 
continues the unrealistic sovereignty claim to continental China as the ROC’s territory and the 
people in the territory as ROC nationals. This ‘equality’ downgrades the authority of the 
government on either side of the Taiwan Strait to jurisdiction (tongzhiquan, 統治權) rather than 
sovereignty.  
This outdated claim apparently cannot keep up with the fact that the interactions between 
Taiwan and China have greatly expanded since November 1987 when the ban on traveling to 
China was lifted. A pressing need was thus felt for regulating the interactions across the Taiwan 
Strait. Article 11 of the Constitutional Amendments thus mandates the government to by-pass the 
Constitution and make special laws for this purpose. Promulgated in July 1992, the Cross-Strait 
Relations Act is the foundation of these special laws and serves the purpose of redefining the 
status of PRC citizens under the legal system of Taiwan. It divides the sovereign territory of the 
ROC into the Mainland Area and the Taiwan Area and makes PRC citizens a special category of 
nationals, who are separated from the citizens of Taiwan. They are pragmatically designated as 
‘People of the Mainland Area,’ The government was determined to enforce this categorization 
by other laws, such as the Employment Services Act, which was initiated for legalizing the 
importation of foreign workers. One of the major debates when the draft bill of the Employment 
Services Act was deliberated was whether the proposed law would apply to PRC citizens, since 
such application might imply that they were foreigners (LY 1992c: 31-33, 34). In January 1992,  
the legislators reached the consensus that this new law could apply (zhunyong, 準用) to PRC 
citizens, although they would not be regarded as foreigners (shiwei, 視為). The government 
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disputed with the legislators (LY, 1992d: 6-25) and a new draft bill specifying the exclusion of 
its application to PRC citizens was later passed by the Legislative Yuan.   
This episode showcases the insistence of the government to ensure that PRC citizens are 
a special kind of nationals, a distinction that is maintained by the Constitutional Court (Yeh, 
2014: 16). They are distinguished from citizens born in Taiwan by their lack of household 
registration in Taiwan.  . This is supported by Article 2 of the Cross-Strait Relations Act, which 
designates the household registration as a de facto nationality distinguishing the People of the 
Taiwan Area (ROC citizens) from the People of the Mainland Area (PRC citizens). 
Fundamentally, an ROC citizen is someone who holds a household registration issued in Taiwan 
(Rigger 2002). The household registration, thus, is appropriated as a make-believe nationality.  
The necessity of maintaining a singular household registration either in Taiwan or in 
China is analogized as non-tolerance for dual nationality of foreign citizens. For the purpose of 
preventing political ‘contamination’ and ensuring the singular and exclusive loyalty of 
Taiwanese citizens, the draft bill of the Cross-Strait Relations Act proposed that a two-year 
consecutive residency of Taiwanese citizens in China would result in the automatic cancellation 
of the household registration in Taiwan and a subsequent loss of citizenship (Article 2). The 
rationale was that two years spent in China would weaken Taiwanese citizens’ identification 
with Taiwan and make them susceptible to communist ideology (EY, 1990: 11-12). Although the 
legislators agreed with the necessity of securing exclusive loyalty toward Taiwan, they argued 
against the idea that two years would lead to an identity shift. Thus, the threshold was eventually 
increased to four years (LY, 1992a: 71; LY, 1992b: 612-614). Household registration as a make-
believe nationality was extended to apply to PRC citizens. In 2002, after the government’s 
announcement of ‘One Country on Each Side’  as a conceptual framework for defining Taiwan-
24 
  
China relations (Jacobs, 2005:45), this quasi-sovereign control method was reinstated by the 
government’s amendments to the Cross-Strait Relations Act (EY, 2002: 52-56). At the height of 
emotive identity politics generated by other amendments (Tseng et al., 2014), the cancellation of 
household registration in China was passed on 9 October 2003 as a necessary condition for PRC 
citizens to be eligible for ROC citizenship (LY, 2003: 287).  
The singular household registration on either side of the Taiwan Strait creates a 
‘sovereignty effect’ (Friedman, 2015) on the ambiguous relationship between Taiwan and China. 
Article 9 of the Cross-Strait Act stipulates that the People of the Taiwan Area are forbidden to 
acquire a household registration in China or obtain a PRC passport, otherwise, it will lead to 
automatic cancellation of their household registration in Taiwan and all citizenship rights, 
including political rights. Article 17 stipulates that a (PRC) Chinese spouse may be eligible for 
citizenship if he/she is of good character, has no criminal record, cancels household registration 
in China, satisfies  the national interest, and has continuously resided in Taiwan for a minimum 
of six years.  
Unlike foreign spouses whose renunciation cannot be realized without the permission of 
their state of origin, PRC Chinese spouses do not seem to encounter objections by local 
governments in China where they apply for the cancellation of their household registration. 
There had been cases of some local governments not  permitting the cancellation unless the 
applicant shows proof of having obtained household registration in Taiwan (Tsai, 2012: 9). This 
may not cause complications since PRC citizens may submit the proof of losing their household 
registration in China within three months after they acquire ROC citizenship. However, if they 
fail to comply, their citizenship will be withdrawn (Article 31, Regulations Governing Sponsored 
Residency, Long-Term Residency and Settlement of People of the Mainland Area in the Taiwan 
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Area). China’s non-objection and Taiwan’s appropriation of household registration (as an 
alternative to nationality) is the embodiment of the hypocrisy of Taiwan’s sovereignty. This 
hypocrisy is verbalized by a Chinese woman I interviewed in the summer of 2009:  
In China, what was cancelled by the Public Security Bureau was my household 
registration. […] This is good for the Chinese government [because in their view] my 
household registration was not cancelled but simply being moved to Taiwan, which [they 
believe] is still under its sovereignty within the Chinese territory. However, the 
perception of the Taiwanese government was that I’ve lost my PRC nationality. […] Both 
governments can please themselves [with what they prefer to believe]’ (Interview, 18 
March 2009, in Taipei).  
 
The façade of using the household registration as an ‘as if’ nationality is maintained by 
both governments across the Strait. It meets the need of the Taiwanese state for exerting its 
quasi-sovereignty and asserting its independence and it also entertains the fantasy of the PRC 
state for One China and its  rejection of Taiwan’s sovereignty. The settlement of Chinese spouses 
has created a judicial and political site where Taiwan’s quasi-sovereignty is exercised without 
evoking the name of sovereignty. It is this as if nationality and the necessity of substituting the 
household registration for nationality that highlights the hypocrisy of the sovereignty of Taiwan. 
Conclusion 
Employing Krasner’s theory of ‘organized hypocrisy’ and focusing on the nationality of foreign 
wives, the findings of this research do not support the popular discourse that transnational 
migration erodes the sway of sovereignty. Instead, sovereignty has been persistently asserted in 
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Taiwan’s demand for foreign spouses to renounce their original citizenship. This paper asserts 
that Taiwan’s exercise of sovereignty is organized hypocrisy particularly when such a demand 
can lead to statelessness for foreign spouses and the pretense of using household registration as a 
make-believe nationality for Chinese spouses. The hypocrisy manifests in different levels. As a 
de facto state, Taiwan has a responsibility to prevent statelessness.  In enforcing its Westphalian 
sovereignty, Taiwan adopts a double standard in its policies and practices concerning nationality. 
It allows its citizens to have dual nationality but demands naturalized citizens to pledge singular 
and exclusive allegiance toward Taiwan. Furthermore, the exceptional status of Taiwan as a de 
facto state receiving limited external recognition renders itself to other aspects of hypocrisy with 
regard to renunciation. Although both adopt the One China Policy, Japan rejects Taiwan’s 
sovereignty, whereas Vietnam seems to tacitly accept Taiwan’s sovereignty. In response, Taiwan 
is accommodating toward Japanese citizens but shows no flexibility toward Vietnamese citizens. 
Taiwan’s contrasting responses to Japan and Vietnam underline the discrepancy between ideals 
or principles and practices about mutual recognition and national sovereignty that are at the heart 
of international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty. When Taiwan’s exercise of 
sovereignty caused the de jure statelessness of Vietnamese women and de facto statelessness of 
their children in Vietnam, it did not acknowledge that it contributed to the problem but instead 
shifted the blame onto the Vietnamese government for failing to restore  its citizens’ loss of 
nationality. Another aspect of hypocrisy is the make-believe nature of Taiwan’s demand of 
cancelling the household registration in China of Chinese spouses. In this case, Taiwan’s 
exercise of sovereignty is under the guise of being an authority of jurisdiction, which 
appropriates household registration as a substitute for nationality. However, the more it intends 
to create a sovereignty effect, the more its ‘not-so-real’ quality is revealed.  Sovereignty has been 
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characterized as a ‘Janus-faced, lawless lawmaker’ (Wachspress 2009: 318). The findings of this 
research suggest that sovereignty cannot be analyzed only as a philosophical construct but a 
reality that has profound socio-political and economic impact on people’s everyday life.  
References 
 
Augustine-Adams K (2002) “She consents implicitly”: Women’s citizenship, marriage, and 
liberal political theory in late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Argentina. Journal of 
Women’s History 13(4): 8-30. Winter.  
 
Batchelor CA (1995) UNHCR and issues related to nationality. Refugee Survey Quarterly 14(3): 
91-112.  
 
BBC Monitoring International Reports (2006) Vietnam restates One-China policy, opposes 
"independent Taiwan" – spokesman. 5 March. Available at: 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=trueand AuthType=ip,shiband 
db=edsnbkand AN=11030A1ADACF0980and site=eds-live   
 




Chamberlain JP (2015) On autonomy and migration: The politics of statelessness. At the 
Interface / Probing the Boundaries 89: 3-28.  
 
Chang J-LJ (2010) Taiwan's participation in the World Health Organization: The U.S. 
“facilitator” role. American Foreign Policy Interests 32(3): 131-146.  
 
 
Chao A (2004) Imagined modernities, transnational marriage and border control: A case study of 
Taiwan’s “mainland brides” [現代性想像與國界管理的衝突：以中國婚姻移民女性為研究案例] 
(In Chinese). Taiwanese Journal of Sociology [台灣社會學刊] 32(June): 59-102. 
 
Chao A (2005) Household registration, social welfare distribution and border control: A case 
study of regulating mainland spouses in Taiwan [社福資源分配的戶籍邏輯與國境管理的限制：
由大陸配偶的入出境管控機制談起] (In Chinese). Taiwanese: A Radical Quarterly in Social 
Studies [台灣社會研究季刊] 59(September): 43-90. 
 
 
Chen CJ (2009) Gendered borders: The historical formation of women's nationality under law in 




Chen C-YJ and Yu T-L (2005) Public attitudes toward Taiwan’s immigration policies [台灣民眾
對外來配偶移民政策的態度] (In Chinese). Taiwanese Sociology [台灣社會學] 10: 95-48. 
 
Chen LT-S (2012) Stateless or belonging to Taiwan or PRC: Nationality and passport of 
overseas Chinese. In: Tan C-B (ed) Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Diaspora. London: 
Routledge, pp. 310-322.  
 
Chen M-H (2010) Sexualized border control: The investigation of ‘phony marriages’ and the 
exclusion of Chinese migrants/sex workers [性化的國境管理：「假結婚」查察與中國移民／性
工作者的排除] (in Chinese). Taiwanese Sociology [台灣社會學]19(June): 55-105. 
 




Cheng I (2013) Making foreign women the mother of our nation: The excluding and assimilating 
immigrant wives from outside.  Asian Ethnicity 14(2):157-179. 
 
Cheng I (2016) Cross-strait marriages and immigration policies. In: Shubert G (ed) Handbook of 
Modern Taiwan Politics and Society. London: Routledge, pp. 447-463.  
 
Cheng I (2017a) She cares because she is a mother: The intersection of citizenship and 
motherhood of Southeast Asian immigrant women in Taiwan. In: Fresnoza-Flot A and 
Ricordeau G (eds) Gender, Migration and Citizenship: Revisiting Southeast Asian 




Deans P (2001) A democracy craving for recognition: A pessimistic view of the impact of 
democratisation on Taiwan’s international status. China Perspectives 34(march-April): 35-
47.  
 
De Hart B (2006a) The unity of the family? Legal perspectives on nationally mixed marriage in 
postwar Europe. In: Waldis B and Byron R (eds) Migration and Marriage: Heterogamy 
and Homogamy in A Changing World. Zurich: LIT Verlag, GmbH and  Co. KG Wien, pp. 
179-199.  
 
De Hart B (2006b) The morality of Maria Toet, gender, citizenship and the construction of the 
nation-state.  Journal of ethnic and Migration Studies 32(1): 49-68.  
 
Epstein AL (1978) Ethos and Identity: Three Studies in Ethnicity.  London: Tavistock 
Publications.  
 
Executive Yuan (EY) (1990)  The Draft Bill of the Act Governing Relations between People of 
the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area Submitted to the Legislative Yuan. The 
29 
  
Legislative Yuan General No. 1554, Initiative of Government No. 3933. [立法院議案關係文
書院總第一五五四號，政府提案第三九三三號，中華民國七十九年十二月五日印發，案由：行政院函
請審議「台灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例草案」案] (In Chinese). 5 December. 
Executive Yuan (EY) (2002)  The Draft Bill of the Act Governing Relations between People of 
the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area Submitted to the Legislative Yuan. The 
Legislative Yuan General No. 1554, Initiative of Government No.  8786. [立法院議案關係文
書院總第一五五四號，政府提案第八七八六號，中華民國九十一年十月十六日印發，案由：行政院函
請審議「台灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例草案」案] (In Chinese).16 October. 
 
 
Feinberg M (2006) Elusive Equality : Gender, Citizenship, and the Limits of Democracy in 
Czechoslovokia, 1918-1950. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
 
Friedman SL (2015) Exceptional States: Chinese Immigrants and Taiwanese Sovereignty. 
Oakland, CA: University of California Press.  
 
   
 
Grossman, A. (2001). Nationality and the Unrecognised State. International & Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 50(4): 849-876.  





Ho PSC (2006) The impact of the U.N. fish stocks agreement on Taiwan's participation in 





Hsiao H-P (2010) The Negotiation and Performance of Cultural Citizenship by Female Japanese 
Spouses in Taiwan [文化公民權協商與展演：以在台日籍女性配偶的生活為例] (In Chinese). 
Master’s Degree dissertation. National Sun Yat-Sen University, Kaohsiung.  
 
 
Hsiao MH-H (2003) Taiwan and Southeast Asia: Go South Policy and Vietnamese Brides. 
Taipei: Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies, Academia Sinica. 
 
Huang L-L (2006) A world without strangers? Taiwan’s new households in the nexus of China 




Huang YL and Wang CH (2013) Chinese question in the Olympic movement: From the 
perspective of Taiwan. International Journal of the History of Sport 30(17):  2052-2068.  
 
Huang Y-H and Liaw B (2012) Taiwan's economic diplomacy in Vietnam from the 1990s to the 
early twenty-first century. East Asia: An International Quarterly 29(4): 355-376.  
Hughes C (1999) Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International 
Society. London: Routledge.  
 
Jacobs B (2005) ‘Taiwanisation’ in Taiwan’s politics. In: Makeham J and Hsiau A-C (eds) 
Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan. Bentuhua. New 
York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.7-54. 
 
Kawaguchi D and Lee S (2012) Brides for Sale: Cross-Border Marriages and Female 
Immigration. Discussion Paper series, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit, No. 6458. 
Available at:  http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:101:1-201208065409 
 
Kingston, LN (2013). “A Forgotten Human Rights Crisis”: Statelessness and Issue (Non) 
Emergence. Human Rights Review, 14(2): 73-87. 
 
Krasner S (1999) Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
 
Kuo Y-H (2011)  Subversions of the social hierarchy: Social closure as adaptation strategy by 
the female marriage migrants of Taiwan. Journal of Comparative Research in 




Lan P-C (2008) Migrant women’s bodies as boundary markers: Reproductive crisis and sexual 
control in the ethnic frontiers of Taiwan. Signs 33(4): 833-861. 
 




Legislative Yuan (LY) (1992a) Record of Floor Meeting. 26 June. (院會紀錄) (In Chinese). The 
Official Gazette of the Legislative Yuan  (立法院公報第八十一卷五十二期) 81(52): 47-77.  
Legislative Yuan (LY) (1992b) Record of the Sixth Joint Deliberation Meeting of the Draft Bill 
of the Act Governing the Relations between the People of Taiwan Area and Mainland Area 
by the Committees of Home Affairs, Judiciary, and Organic Laws and Statutes (Eighty-
Ninth Session of the Frst Legislative Yuan). 23 June (In Chinese).  The Official Gazette of 
the Legislative Yuan  [立法院公報第八十一卷二十六期]  81(26): 607-653. 
31 
  
Legislative Yuan (LY) (1992c) Record of Floor Meeting [院會紀錄]. 9 January (In Chinese). The 
Official Gazette of the Legislative Yuan [立法院公報第八十一卷第五期]  81(5): 26-63. 
Legislative Yuan (LY) (1992d) Record of Floor Meeting[院會紀錄]. 14 January (In Chinese). 
The Official Gazette of the Legislative Yuan [立法院公報第八十一卷 第六期]  81(6): 6-25. 
Legislative Yuan (LY) (1998a) Minutes of the First Joint Deliberation Meeting of the Draft Bill 
of the Immigration Act by the Committees of Home and Frontier Affairs, Foreign and 
Overseas Chinese Affairs, Transport and Communication, and Judicial Affairs, the Sixth 
Session of the Third Legislative Yuan. 2 November (In Chinese) The Legislative Yuan 
Gazette [立法院公報第八十七卷第四十五期]  87(45): 183-232.  
 Legislative Yuan (LY) (1998b) Minutes of the Second Joint Deliberation Meeting of the Draft 
Bill of the Immigration Act of the Committees of Home and Frontier Affairs, Foreign and 
Overseas Chinese Affairs, Transport and Communication, and Judicial Affairs (Sixth 
Session of the Third Legislative Yuan). 16 December (In Chinese). The Legislative Yuan 
Gazette  [立法院公報第八十七卷第五十期] 87(50): 249-305. Legislative Yuan (LY) (2003) 
Record of Floor Meeting [院會紀錄]. 9 October (In Chinese). The Official Gazette of the 
Legislative Yuan [立法院公報第九十二卷 第四十一期] 92(41): 284-327.  
Legislative Yuan (LY) (2016)  Minutes of the 9
th
 Plenary Meeting of the Committee of Home 
Affairs, the 1
st
 Session of the 9
th
 Legislative Yuan. 18 April (In Chinese). The Legislative 




Lih Pao (2008) Vietnamese Spouses Who Lost Marriage May Restore Nationality. 11 March (In 
Chinese). Available at: http://www.Lihpao.com/?action-viewers-itemid-6795 
 
Liberty Times (2007). Cambodian Brides May Become Statelessness. 4 March (In Chinese). 
Available at:  news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/118474   
 
Lu C-Y (2000) Politics of foreign labor policy in Taiwan. Journal of Asian and  African Studies 
35(1): 113-131.  
.  
 
McKinsey K (2007) Divorce leaves some Vietnamese women broken-hearted and stateless. 
UNHCR. 14 February.  Available at:  http://www.unhcr.org/45d324428.html    
McKinsey K (2009) Viet Nam sets the pace for Asia with new law to prevent statelessness. 
UNHCR. 1 July. Available at:  http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2009/7/4a4b809d9/viet-
nam-sets-pace-asia-new-law-prevent-statelessness.html   
32 
  
McKinsey K (2010) Preventing Statelessness: Southeast Asian Countries Share Lessons. 




Ministry of the Interior (MoI) (2015) Statistical Yearbook of Interior (Numbers of the 
Acquisition of ROC Nationality). Available at:  http://sowf.moi.gov.tw/stat/year/list.htm  
Morello F (1966) The International Legal Status of Formosa. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.   
 
National Security Council (NSC) (2006) National Security Report (In Chinese). Taipei: National 
Security Council. 
 
National Immigration Agency (NIA) (2017) Numbers of Foreign Spouses and Mainland Spouses 





Peng S-Y (1997). Economic relations between Taiwan and Southeast Asia: A review of Taiwan's 
Go South policy. Wisconsin International Law Journal 16(3): 639-660. 
 
Rigger S (2002) Nationalism versus citizenship in the Republic of China on Taiwan. In:  
Goldman M and Perry EJ (eds) Changing Meanings of Citizenship in Modern China. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press,  pp. 353-372.  
 
Roy D (2003) Taiwan: A Political History. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.  
Scott JB (1929) Problems of nationality: International status of married women. Advocate of 
Peace through Justice 91(3): 137-140.  
Sheu Y-H (2007) Full responsibility with partial citizenship: Immigrant wives in Taiwan. Social 
Policy and Administration 41(2): 179-196.  
 
Studer B (2001) ‘Citizenship as Contingent National Belonging: Married Women and Foreigners 
in Twentieth-Century Switzerland’. Gender & History 13(3): 622-654 November 
 







Tsai C-C (2012) An analysis on the equality of naturalisation regulations for foreign spouses and 
mainland spouses and a critique on the protection of their rights and lives in Taiwan [論外籍
及大陸配偶在臺入籍規範之權益衡平性－兼論兩者在臺生活權益保障之現況及檢討] (In Chinese). 
Paper presented at the Conference on Population Movement and Law Enforcement, 13 
November, Taipei.  
 
Tsai C-J (2008) An Analysis on Basic Family Rights of Foreign Spouses and Expulsion: A Case 
Study of the Verdict of Su 20581 by Taipei High Administrative Court in 2006 [自外籍配偶
家庭基本權之保障論驅逐出國處分 - 評臺北高等行政法院95年度訴字第02581號判決] (In Chinese). 
Paper presented at the Conference on Border Security and Population Movement, 8 
December, Taipei. 
 
Tsai M-C (2011) ‘Foreign brides’ meet ethnic politics in Taiwan.  International Migration 
Review 45(3): 243-268.  
  
 
Tseng W-C (1999) An Analysis on the Immigration Act [入出國移民法釋論] (In Chinese). 
Taipei: Cheng Chung. 
Tseng Y-F and Komiya Y (2011) Classism in immigration control and migrant integration. In: 
Ngo T-W and Wang H-Z (eds) Politics of Difference in Taiwan.. London: Routledge,  pp. 
98-115.  
Tseng Y-C, Cheng I and Fell D (2014) The politics of the mainland spouses’ rights’ movement 
in Taiwan. In: Fell D, Chiu K-F and Lin P (eds) Migration to and from Taiwan. London: 
Routledge, pp. 205-226. 
Tucker NB (2011) Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
UNHCR (2010)  Good Practices: Addressing Statelessness in South East Asia. Report of the 
Regional Expert Roundtable on Good Practices for the Identification, Prevention and 
Reduction of Statelessness and the Protection of Stateless Persons in South East Asia, 
Bangkok, 28 to 29 October. At http://www.unhcr.org/protection/statelessness/4d7de47f9/good-
practices-addressing-statelessness-south-east-asia-report-regional.html 
Van Waas L (2012) Fighting statelessness and discriminatory nationality laws in Europe. 
European Journal of Migration and Law 14: 243–260.   
 
Wachspress M (2009) Rethinking sovereignty with reference to history and anthropology. 




Wang H-Z (2008) Taiwanizing female immigrant spouses and materializing differential 
citizenship. Citizenship Studies 12(1): 91-106.  
 
Wang H-Z (2011) Immigration trends and policy changes in Taiwan. Asian and Pacific 
Migration Journal 20(2): 169-194.   
 
 
Wu Y-T  (2008) Taiwan international family in a difficult situation of the legislation. Taiwan 
International Law Quarterly 5(1): 51-82.  
Xinhua News Agency (2002) Indonesian consulate general in HK reiterates One-China policy. 
Available at:  http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/39718.htm  
 
 
Yang C-J and Chien H-C (2010) Could Taiwan be included in UNFCCC negotiations? Climate 
Policy (Earthscan) 10(3): 317-321.  
 
Yang W-Y and Lee P-R (2009) The citizenship dilemma of mainlander spouses in Taiwan: The 
conspiracy of nationalism and patriarchy [大陸配偶的公民權困境一國族與父權的共謀] (In 
Chinese). Taiwan Democracy Quarterly [臺灣民主季刊] 6(3): 47-86.  
 
 
Yeh C-H (2014) The legal status of foreign spouse - from the aspects of entry, permanent stay, 
and naturalization [論外籍配偶的法律地位－以入境、居留與歸化為中心] (In Chinese). Taiwan 
International Law Quarterly [台灣國際法季刊] 11(3): 7-26.  
 
 
Yuval-Davis N and Anthias F (1989)  Woman-Nation-State.  London: Macmillan.  
 
